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Abstract
Advanced driver assistance systems (ADASs) enhance transportation safety and mobility, and reduce impacts on the environment 
and economical costs, through decreasing driver errors. One of the main features of ADASs is cruise control system that 
maintains the driver's desired speed without intervention from the driver. Adaptive cruise control (ACC) systems adjust the 
vehicle's speed to maintain a safe following distance to the vehicle in front. Adding vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-
infrastructure communications (V2X) to ACC systems, result in cooperative adaptive cruise control (CACC) systems, where each 
vehicle has trajectory data of all other vehicles in the same lane. Although CACC systems offer advantages over ACC systems in 
increasing throughput and average speed, they are more vulnerable to cyber-security attacks. This is due to V2X communications 
that increase the attack surface from one vehicle to multiple vehicles. In this paper, we inject common types of attack on the 
application layer of connected vehicles to show their vulnerability in comparison to autonomous vehicles. We also proposed a 
decision support system that eliminates risk of inaccurate information. The microscopic work simulates a CACC system with a 
bi-objective PID controller and a fuzzy detector. A case study is illustrated in detail to verify the system functionality.
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1. Cooperative adaptive cruise control
The purpose of advanced driver assistance systems (ADASs) is that driver error is reduced or even eliminated, 
and efficiency in transport is enhanced. Benefits of ADASs implementations are potentially considerable because of 
a significant decrease in human suffering, economical costs, and environmental pollution [1].
One of the main features of ADASs is cruise control system that accurately maintains the driver's desired set 
speed, without intervention from the driver.
Adaptive cruise control (ACC) systems are advanced cruise control systems, which enable the drivers to set a 
desired cruising speed as well as a desired gap with respect to a lead vehicle. If a lead vehicle is present, the system 
automatically adjusts the vehicle’s speed to maintain a safe following distance to the vehicle in front. Otherwise, the 
system works as a conventional cruise control system [2].
ACC systems use LiDAR sensors to measure the distance to the back of the preceding vehicle and also to sense 
rate of change in the measured distance to take proper actions in response to the acceleration and deceleration of the 
target vehicle. These systems have a considerable high response delay in detecting changes to the trajectory data of 
the lead vehicle that results in a large threshold for the minimum safe gap [3].
Adding wireless vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications to ACC systems 
result in cooperative adaptive cruise control (CACC) systems. CACC systems have faster response to the 
predecessor’s gas and brake pedal actuator, which allows a significant reduction in the safe gap between the rear end 
of the target vehicle and the front of the host vehicle [4].
ACC features are compatible with autonomous vehicles (AVs), where each vehicle is not subject to any 
additional input from other vehicles or infrastructure. This limits the ability of ACC systems to follow the target
vehicle accurately and respond to speed changes of the leading vehicle in a timely manner. This can also negatively
affect the traffic flow capacity and stability.
Connected vehicles (CVs) involve some level of coordination between the vehicles and the roadway 
infrastructure, where each vehicle is not entirely independent. Adding communication systems to ACC systems 
make any vehicle possible to follow the leading vehicle with higher accuracy and faster response to changes. This 
can improve traffic throughput, reduce traffic congestion, increase average speed, and enhance the flow’s string 
stability, without compromising safety or expanding roadway infrastructure [5].
2. Problem statement
ADASs rely on a range of sensing and communication systems. Such dependencies make vehicular platforms 
vulnerable to a multitude of cyber-security threats, which have the potential to endanger passengers’ safety [6].
AVs are capable of navigating themselves without human input. AVs use different combination of elements 
including sensors, laser, GPS, map, and stereo cameras to perceive the environment. These integrated components 
can form potential attack surfaces [7].
On the other hand, CVs use V2V and V2I communications (V2X) to get trajectory data of all other vehicles in a 
specific segment. Although the additional information can provide supplementary tools to verify the vehicles’ status, 
they can provide attackers with additional attack surface [8].
To propose a robust CACC system, we assumed a platoon of three vehicles driving at a specific following 
distance. Although the gap between the vehicles is dependent on the trajectory data of the two proceeding vehicles,
it is more secure to use the distance measurements from sensing technologies.
To develop a decision support system (DSS), the microscopic work simulates a CACC system with a bi-objective 
PID controller, where inputs to the controller are distance error and speed error, and output is acceleration or 
braking. If the measured distance is less than the desired gap, the speed of the host vehicle changes to the speed of 
the target vehicle. To ensure system resiliency, a fuzzy detector is proposed that predicts the speed of the leader
vehicle using state estimator and adjusts the safe distance.
The main contribution of this paper is to develop a DSS to address security issues at the application layer of a 
system of CVs. This is done through designing a control strategy that detects possible threats and takes proper 
actions to prevent subsequent incidents.
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3. System setup
Consider a platoon of three vehicles that use wireless V2V communications to send their current state including 
location, speed, and acceleration/deceleration, and receive the same data from other vehicles in the same lane (Fig. 
1). For the ease of calculations, the vehicles are numbered starting with the platoon leader as vehicle 1, its follower 
as vehicle 2, and the last one as vehicle 3.
Wireless communication Wireless communication
LIDAR measurement LIDAR measurement
Follower i=3 Follower i=2 Leader i=1
Fig. 1. Cooperative adaptive cruise control system.
Dedicated short-range communication (DSRC) is a wireless communication system that provides transmission of 
data between the vehicles and the roadside or between the vehicles and other vehicles. This source of data is not 
robust enough to cyber threats [9]. To enhance the system resiliency, the distance between the two proceeding 
vehicles is measured using LiDAR sensors. However, it is less accurate to use this measurement for calculating the 
trajectory data of the target vehicle [10].
4. System setup
Let’s consider a vehicle with mass m and velocity v. u represents the force generated at the tire interface in the 
opposite or the same direction of the vehicle’s speed. From the Newton’s second law of motion, a state-space model 
of a cruise control system can be obtained as in Equation (1).
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where v is the vehicle’s velocity, b is the friction force between the road and the tire, i is the vehicle ID, and u is the 
driving force of the vehicle’s engine. After rearranging the Laplace transform function in Equation (2), the transfer 
function of the open-loop cruise control system for each of the vehicles can be obtained as Equation (3).
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5. System dynamics under attack
Although CVs benefit from communication of data, which allows them to have faster responses and considerable 
shorter vehicle-following gaps, a system of CVs is vulnerable to different types of cyber-security attacks on its
physical layer, application layer, and network layer (Fig. 2) [11]. Physical-layer and privacy-leakage attacks are 
related to the hardware or software of each vehicle. Application-layer attacks affect particular functions of the 
system such as CACC. Main examples of this type of attack are message falsification, spoofing, and replay attacks. 
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In network-layer attacks, adversary targets multiple applications functionality. Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack and 
spoof jamming are common examples. 
Fig. 2. Potential attack surface for connected vehicles.
The state space model of the system of CVs under attack is modeled as the following equation.
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where is the fault speed injected to the system.
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Į and ȕ are zero for DoS attack, and are random values for false data injection (FDI) attack.
6. Control methodology
Consider a system of three CVs driving in the same lane. These vehicles use V2X communications for exchange 
of data. Our control system consists of a bi-objective PID controller and a fuzzy detector (Fig. 3). When distance 
between the two preceding vehicles drops below the safe threshold, our proposed controller is engaged to maintain 
the desired gap and speed.
6.1. Bi-objective PID controller
The bi-objective PID controller has speed error and distance error as inputs and braking/acceleration actuation as 
output. Speed error is defined as the difference between the desired speed and the speed of the subject vehicle. 
When no leading vehicle is detected, the desired speed is the same as the reference cruise speed. Otherwise, this 
value is equal to the speed of the target vehicle. On the other hand, distance error is the difference in the gap 
measured using LiDAR sensors and the safe desired distance.
CACC drivers can choose a safe headway from 0.6 to 1.1 sec, in contrast to the available ACC settings from 1.1 
to 2.2 sec [12]. The distance corresponding to this time gap is clearance that is product of the headway and the 
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subject vehicle’s speed. To address the initial space between the two vehicles, a minimum safe distance of 2 ft is 
added to the clearance value.
Fig. 3. The proposed control methodology.
6.2. Fuzzy detector
In CACC systems, the lead vehicle trajectory data are transmitted to the follower vehicles through DSRC 
wireless communication. These data are vulnerable to cyber-security threats and are not reliable enough to be used 
directly in the control system. To propose a robust controller, the lead vehicle’s motion is estimated using a state 
estimator [13].
As shown in Fig. 4, values of the membership function are assigned to the linguistic variables using three fuzzy 
subsets called low, medium, and high [14, 15]. Inputs to the proposed fuzzy detector are speed of the follower 
vehicle and the difference between the actual and the estimated speed of the lead vehicle. Output is the additional 
safe distance added to the current gap to prevent possible incidents.
Fig. 4. Inputs and output of the proposed fuzzy detector.
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Nine fuzzy rules are generated with the knowledge base of the system (Table 1). Where L, M, and H are add low, 
add medium, and add high positive values to the minimum safe distance between the two vehicles.
Table 1. Fuzzy rules.
        Speed Low Medium High
Speederror
Low L L L
Medium M M H
High M H H
7. Results
In this section, a series of scenarios are performed to test performance of the designed controller under a range of 
representative driving conditions. Fig. 5 shows a scenario, in which the lead vehicle makes repeated accelerate and 
decelerate maneuvers, while the subject vehicle follows it if the distance is less than gap distance otherwise follows 
its own desired speed. The proposed PID controller can smoothly track changes in the reference speed. Note that the 
follower PID controller is designed to response faster to changes compared with leader PID controller.
Fig. 5 (a) shows deceleration of the lead vehicle after two-step acceleration. In the first 30 seconds, the vehicle is 
speeding up. But at the end of this time, the vehicle starts slowing down. With the feed-forward information from 
wireless communications, CACC controller of the host vehicle reacts very quickly to the speed changes of the target 
vehicle and brakes in a timely manner to avoid rear-end collisions (Fig. 5 (b)). It should be noted that the follower 
vehicle reference speed increases at 10 seconds which is 5 seconds later than leading vehicle. As shown in Fig. 5 (c), 
the minimum safe distance between the two vehicles is well regulated at 2 ft.
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Fig. 5. Cooperative adaptive cruise control system under normal condition.
The second scenario evaluates performance of the system under FDI or DoS attack. The proposed fuzzy detector 
constantly compares the lead vehicle’s speed obtained from DSRC communication with the estimated speed of the 
lead vehicle using the state estimator. When this value exceeds a specified fuzzy threshold, safe distance between 
the two vehicles must be increased with respect to the follower vehicle’s speed.
As shown in Fig 6 (a), an adversary injects a fault data to the system at time 31 sec. This threat transmits a false 
value of 20 mi/h to the follower vehicle. In absence of a resilient control system, the subject vehicle assumes that the 
target vehicle is driving at the speed of 20 mi/h. This results in rear-end collisions that may endanger passengers’
safety (Fig. 6 (d)). To propose a resilient control system, the controller adds an additional distance of approximately 
4.5 ft to the minimum safe distance to prevent subsequent incidents (Fig. 6 (b) and Fig. 6 (c)).
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Fig. 6. Cooperative adaptive cruise control system under false data injection attack.
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8. Conclusion
Autonomous vehicles (AVs) use sensing technologies to detect presence of the vehicle ahead in addition to the 
following gap and rate of change in the distance measurements. Sensing a change in the lead vehicle’s motion 
increases the response duration and limits the ability of AVs to react quickly and accurately to the target vehicle’s 
deceleration.
Connecting vehicles via wireless communication allows for faster and more accurate response to changes. From 
this perspective, connected vehicles (CVs) are better able to dampen shock waves in the traffic stream. Although 
AVs are resilient in terms of cyber-security attacks due to their on-board control systems and less attack surface,
CVs are less robust due to the data transmission between the vehicles.
In this paper, we proposed a bi-objective PID controller that adjusts the subject vehicle’s speed with respect to 
the deceleration of the leading vehicle and error in the distance measurements. To address security issues of a 
system of CVs, a fuzzy detector is also introduced that detects possibility of a cyber threat and takes proper actions 
in response to the specific attack.
Results clearly show that our designed controller works well under both secure and unsecure conditions. The 
control system can detect any adversary access to the system and can prevent subsequent crashes by adjusting the 
safe following distance.
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